Autocrats and Trade Policy

Why do some autocrats adopt greater trade liberalization policies than others? Among the political economy theories explaining trade policy patterns, surprisingly little systematic research has been conducted on trade liberalization policies in autocracies. One reason for the lack of research stems from the commonly held assumption that autocratic elites have homogeneous preferences. Relaxing this assumption, I argue that institutional differences in autocracies can lead to systematically different trade policies. When autocratic governments are controlled by a single-party, autocrats have a general incentive to adopt protectionist policies since they reflect the narrow preferences of the party leaders. As more parties are allowed to participate in government there is a move toward liberalization. The inclusion of more than one party creates an exit option that coalitions use as leverage to pursue trade policies reflecting a broader set of interests. Using tariff data (1970-1999) on a sample of more than 40 authoritarian states, I find support for my argument with single-party systems adopting the most protectionist policies and multi-party systems adopting the most liberal policies.